Who Lost Gettysburg?

This article is about a leadership lesson from the American Civil War - specifically the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg. There are some who might misconstrue a military case study with some sympathy for the hideous practice of slavery.

That's about the silliest thing I've ever heard. Now, on with the story...

You've probably heard it said that the battle of Gettysburg was the turning point in the American Civil War. I would like to take a few moments to talk about why, and perhaps gain some leadership insight from those terrible days.

Up until Gettysburg, the Confederate strategy was one of attack. In fact, Gettysburg occurred because General Lee took his Army into Pennsylvania. Up until that time all every major battle had been fought in the South. The plan had numerous benefits: Bringing the fight north would make the people uncomfortable, hurt morale, and possibly erode popular support for the war effort. It also had the side benefit that confederate soldiers would live off the land without stealing from the people of the confederacy - who were having a very hard time getting by, having lost most able young people to the war effort and with a federal blockade in place. So Lee took his troops north.

The first major breakdown actually came well before the battle; in fact, it was chain-of-command problem. So let's start out with a discussion of the Confederate Chain-of-Command. A confederate Army was split into corps, which were further sub-divided into divisions, and broken further into brigades. The basic combat units involved were infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The Army of Northern Virginia (the South) included three corps of infantry, commanded by Lt. Generals James Longstreet, A.P. Hill, and James Ewell. Our focus will be on Longstreet's Corp, which consisted of four divisions, commanded by Major General's George Pickett, Lawfeyett McClaws, and John Bell Hood. (See Gettysburg Confederate order of battle on Wikipedia.)

The Army of northern Virginia also had a single separate Cavalry Division, Commanded by Major General J.E.B. Stuart. The artillery units were smaller and 'attached' to larger infantry units.

Three interesting things happened to communication during Gettysburg, all of which contributed to the confederate loss.

First of all, the Cavalry failed in it's role as the intelligence-gathering arm of the Army. Traditionally, Cavalry has three roles: It can move behind enemy lines, disrupting communications and supply lines. Because Cavalry can move faster than infantry, they can gather information about the enemy's size and position. Finally, during the heat of battle, Cavalry can be a quick-moving assault force to plug gaps, act as a reserve or breach the enemy's weaknesses.

General Lee was expecting J.E.B. Stuart's Cavalry unit to report on the size and position of the union advance, so he could maneuver his troops to the best positions. This just did not happen; Stuart took his time running around Maryland, blowing up supply depots and engaging in skirmishes. Because of that problem, the Union Forces occupied Gettysburg first and took the high ground. On day one of Gettysburg, Hill and Ewell's forces essential 'ran into' a superior union force and engaged. As a result, Lee got a battle he didn't want at the wrong time, without a knowledge of the Union's troop strength.

However, Lee did not personally write up the order for General Stuart. Instead, his aide and defacto chief of staff, Walter Taylor wrote the order that was just vague enough, and gave just enough latitude, that Stuart could claim his cavalry sweep was within orders.

The Army of Northern Virginia had never been dealt a solid defeat, and Lee believed that they would prevail. He ordered an infantry charge of all three corps on the second day, July 2, 1863. It is interesting to note that the far right of Longstreet's Corps, which was Hood's Division, could see the end of the union line. According to Shaara, Hood went to Longstreet and suggested a change in plans: Have all three of Longstreet's units shift to the south and west, walk around the union positions, and attack them from the rear! According to historical accounts, Longstreet replied something to the effect that he had already tried to convince Lee that a frontal assault was foolish, and had been over-ruled. The attack would be a frontal assault the next day, led by George Pickett.

We mostly know the rest of the story: Pickett led a long march across a wide field in the face of direct artillery fire. His troops had just breached the union line when they buckled back in retreat. That night, when asked by Lee where his division was camped, Pickett made the famous reply 'General, I have no division.'

I would like to stop for a moment here and ask the unasked question. Put yourself in the shoes of General Lee, and ask yourself: Who was responsible for the loss of the battle of Gettysburg? Was it the Cavalry officer who didn't do his job? The chief of staff who wrote the improper order? The corps commander who heard the idea that could have changed the battle, and turned his back on it?

While you may never command an Army in combat, this question of responsibility is very real one. I would ask you to not skip ahead, but instead, turn away from the screen and take a few moments to ponder this question. You are General Lee. Who was responsible?

Take a few moments. Get a Pepsi or a Coke. Take a walk. Ponder. This can wait until you get back. Really.
...

Ok. Do you have an answer? History tells us that Lee was asked this very same question by his political leaders in Richmond, Virginia. When asked who to hold responsible for the defeat at the battle of Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee sent back a two-word answer:

'I am.'

As the ranking commander on-scene, General Lee took personal responsibility for the results of his command. Instead of placing blame on someone else, General Lee offered his resignation to the president of the confederacy, who refused to accept it.

As a cadet, soldier, citizen, or businessman, things will go wrong on our missions. People will make mistakes. There is a reason that the term 'the burden of command' has existed since antiquity. As leaders, we must be willing to take responsibility. We must want to command.

That is the single most valuable lesson I personally took from my study of that battle, one I like to ask cadets during the Mitchell Review board, and one I pleased to offer to you today.

Even in defeat, General Lee showed honor. As I understand it, in the early 1900's Congress asked each state to provide the busts of two war heroes for public display. The State of Virginia choose General George Washington and General Robert E. Lee, and had to wait thirty years for Congress to accept Lee, by law, as an American War Hero.

Dwight L. Moody once said 'If a man wants to improve his reputation, he must first look to his character. If I take care of my character, my reputation will take care of itself.' Lee did that even in defeat by taking responsibility for his command. I submit to you that responsibility is a pre-requisite for command of any unit - be it the Army of Northern Virginia, or Bravo Flight of Squadron one of the North Dakota Wing Summer Encampment .

References:
1) Wikipedia. The Battle of Gettysburg
2) Shaara, Michael. The Killer Angels. Random House, 1974.
3) Skimin, Robert. Gray Victory. St. Martin's Press, New York, New York, 1988.
July 1-3, 1863.